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 Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to test the new economics of labor migration theory (NELM) 
using panel data on rural farm households in Kenya. There are is a significant migration-
induced labor loss. Number of migrants has a negative influence crop and total farm 
income. These findings are consistent with other studies that crop income does decrease as 
migrants leave their households. The implication is that these findings support the 
predictions of NELM, that migration is associated with lost-labor effects and increased 
incomes from other sources. However, our findings do not support other studies 
conclusions that remittances may be partially or fully offset the lost income from labor 
constraint. However, study findings indicate that taken together, migration and remittances 
play a role in production activities of migrant-sending households.  
  2Patterns of rural-urban migration in Kenya have changed since independence in 
1963, specifically to more permanent settlement of males in cities and increased long-term 
circulation of females between areas of family settlement and economic opportunity 
(Thadani, 1982 cited in Brockerhoff and Biddlecom, 1999). Frequent movement between 
cities/towns and the rural home is a common practice among many Kenyans, particularly 
in search of rewarding economic opportunities.  
International migration in Kenya has also increased especially in the last two 
decades. It has received considerable attention in literature especially with respect to brain 
drain of students and workers, the level of remittances and the range of money transfer 
services operating in Kenya. Kenyans in the diaspora are contributing an equivalent of 3.8 
per cent of national income through remittances compared to 2 per cent the total foreign 
assistant (Ngunjiri, 2006). 
However, there are only a few studies on internal migration in Kenya. Such studies 
tend to focus on determinants of migration decisions and remittance flows from migrants 
in small and specific geographical areas e.g., (Barber, 1988, Hoddinott, 1994, Hoddinott, 
1992).  Although useful research exists, there remains a need for deeper understanding of 
internal migration and its impact on rural livelihoods. Moreover, no study in Kenya has 
sought to test the new economics of labor migration hypothesis. 
Migration has competing effects on households which send migrants out. On one 
hand, households may face a labor constraint when members migrate from the village. This 
reduction in labor may lead to decreased crop production and yields, and therefore 
cropping income. On the other hand remittances directly may increase income available for 
consumption, and/or raise incomes through on-and off-farm activities. Migrants play the 
  3role of financial intermediaries, enabling rural households to overcome credit and risk 
constraints to participate in commercial production (Taylor et al, 2003). Where formal 
credit markets do not function well, households are forced to self-finance investments in 
production assets (e.g., farm implements and inputs) and off-farm activities, as well as self-
insure against various risks. Therefore, remittances play an effective role in overcoming 
these constraints.  
The new economics of labor migration (NELM) theory indicates that migration and 
migrants remittances have competing effects; they can relax or tighten labor and credit 
constraints for rural households. A finding of a significant effect of remittances on any 
non-migration source of household income or agricultural productivity would be evidence 
in support of the NELM theory. In particular, negative effects would imply that migration 
exacerbates labor shortages, while positive effects would indicate that migration 
complements productivity or household income by relaxing credit or risk constraints.  
A few tests of the hypothesis can be found in literature (Dwayne, 1998) finds that 
remittances relax risk constraints on household farm investments. A study by (Taylor, 
2003) finds that labor shortages due to migration negatively affect cropping income of 
migrant-sending households. However, they also show that migrant remittances positively 
compensate for the lost labor, contributing to household incomes directly and also 
indirectly by stimulating crop and possibly self-employment production. Lost labor due to 
migration has been found to have a negative impact on maize production in China, but 
remittances partially offset some of these losses (Rozelle et al, 1999). Therefore, there is 
no clear cut answer to the effect of immigration on farm productivity and incomes. 
  4This paper seeks to test the NELM hypothesis. The approach used to test this 
hypothesis draws heavily from Taylor (2003). The aggregate effect of migration on 
household production will play a role in determining the way migration affects different 
sources of household income. In order to test the NELM hypothesis, we estimate the net 
effect of migration and remittances on household income. The questions addressed are: (i) 
does migration-induced labor loss reduce crop income?; (ii) what is the effect of 
remittances on crop production  income?; and (iii) how do remittances affect other income 
sources?  
The econometric model is based on a set of inter-related equations on household 
income sources, remittances and migration.  If a household faces production constraints, 
and if migration and remittances are important in shaping these constraints, then the vector 
of household income sources depends on migration and remittances, as well as various 
individual, household and community characteristics. On the other hand, remittances are 
generated by migrant family members and given migration, they are a function of human 
capital and household characteristics. Migration is in turn a function of individual, 
household and community characteristics. These equations form a recursive system and 
will be estimated using simultaneous-equation econometric methods. Remittances and 
migration are determined endogenously along with income sources. To control for 
endogeneity, instruments are used to identify remittances and migration.  
No other study has used a longer panel dataset to analyze determinants of migration 
and remittances and test the NELM hypothesis in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, this 
paper makes an important contribution to empirical literature on internal migration in 
  5Kenya. Results will provide insights into the competing effects that migration has on rural 
farm households in Kenya.  
 
Role of migration and remittances in development 
This paper looks at the role/impacts of migration and remittances in the context of 
migrant-sending households. There are several theories that aim to explain why people 
migrate. The oldest and perhaps best-known is the macro theory of neoclassical economics.  
This focuses on “pull” and “push” factors, where migration is caused by differences in the 
supply of and demand for labor in sending and receiving regions (Harris, 1970).   The 
micro theory of neoclassical economics also known as the rational choice theory states that 
individuals are rational actors and decide to migrate after a cost-benefit analysis guarantees 
a positive net return from migration (Todaro, 1987). Demographic and sociological 
literature has focused on the social network theory (Massey, 1994, Massey, 1993). 
Network theory hypothesizes that migrant networks in origin and destination regions 
increase the likelihood of migration by lowering the risks/costs of newcomers, providing a 
support network for them and facilitating their integration in the labor market of the 
destination areas.  
The new economics of labor migration (NELM) (Stark, 1991) defines migration as 
a tool that households use to overcome market failures. By sending a family member away 
from home to work, a household makes an investment that will be recovered if the 
migrant’s remit some income later. These remittances are very important where there are 
poorly functioning local markets for capital, credit, and insurance. According to NELM, 
missing, inefficient, or poorly functioning markets are necessary for the migration of labor 
  6to occur. Others have argued that there exists an implicit or explicit contractual 
arrangement between the family and the migrant (Stark and Lucas, 1988). Migration is not 
the result of a decision made by an isolated individual; it is part of a family strategy 
(Hoddinott, 1994, Stark, 1991).  
Regardless of the theories relevant in any context, migration may have significant 
effects on household economic activities. Migration is associated with loss of human 
resources for the migrant-sending households which may translate into a loss in 
production. Households face a labor constraint when their members migrate. This 
reduction in labor may lead to decreased crop production and yields, or cropping income. It 
is also argued that if migrants take capital (human or financial) with them, migrant-sending 
households suffer additional losses in decreased capital stock. This in turn may adversely 
affect the productivity of other complementary inputs including labor (Taylor, 1999). 
These capital and labor losses may negatively affect welfare of migrant-sending 
households and economic growth of migrant-sending regions. 
Migrant-sending households are often recipients of remittances from migrants, 
which can be considered as a payment for the labor services they export (Stark and Lucas, 
1988, Stevens, 1999, Taylor, 1999). As Taylor et al (2003) indicate, migrants are usually 
attached to their rural homes and as a result of their “homeward” focus, they have 
economic incentives to promote and enhance the welfare of those left behind. This is 
possible, either through remittances or savings that they bring back when they return.  In 
the literature, there exist different theoretical explanations of remittance behavior. These 
include: (i) altruism, which suggests that remittances rise when the economic needs of 
families back home increase (Becker, 1974); (ii) self-interest, where the migrants’ 
  7motivation is based on expectation to inherit land or other wealth. In this case, migrants 
make investments in their homes that are taken care of by non-migrating family members; 
(iii) the concept of exchange, in which migrants are viewed as effectively paying back 
family and relatives for investments in the education or travel of the migrant (Cox, 1987) 
and; (iv) the notion of co-insurance, where both migrant and family provide monetary and 
in-kind transfers to ensure each other against temporary shocks (Lucas, 1985). Taylor et. 
al. (1999) refers to this motivation to remit as the NELM motive where “migrants and their 
households are bound together by mutually beneficial, informal contracts, including an 
agreement to provide income insurance to one another”. 
  Remittances are generally viewed as a source of income, insurance, and capital 
accumulation and thus constitute the biggest direct effect of migration on migrant-sending 
households. Taylor (1999) indicates that remittances can reduce or even reverse the 
negative effects of labor and capital losses associated with migration. Remittances can 
contribute directly to incomes of migrant-sending households, as long as remittances are 
greater than the value of production lost due to migration. In addition, remittances can 
indirectly contribute to incomes and production of migrant-sending households. This is 
because remittances facilitate households to overcome capital and risk constraints on 
production activities. In the absence of credit markets, households can utilize remittances 
to purchase production inputs that could improve on-farm and off-farm production 
activities. Hence remittances are a source of scarce capital for households and provide 
insurance against risks emanating from new production activities and technologies. The 
magnitude and importance of the indirect effects of remittances hinges on how tight the 
constraints that households face are. In situations where these constraints are binding, 
  8households’ incentives to send migrants and the attendant indirect effects on incomes, may 
be large. From the aforementioned, it is clear that the magnitude and direction of the net 
effects of migration cannot be determined a priori and is therefore an empirical question. 
 
The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) Theory
2
The new economics of migration theory as mentioned earlier asserts that migration 
decisions are made by households and not by individual actors. Households attempt to 
maximize income and minimize risks resulting from market failures in unstable economies 
to improve their income relative to the rest of the community (Stark, 1991). The migration 
decisions result from the volatility or failures of local markets, as portrayed by lack of 
access to credit and livelihood risk insurance.  These imperfect or incomplete markets 
typically characterize rural areas in developing countries. Therefore, in NELM, households 
are hypothesized to use migration as a means to overcome missing markets or market 
failures locally, which compel households to self-finance investments in production and 
self-insure against income risk. Households send migrants out as part of a strategy to 
diversify income sources, obtain capital for investment and provide insurance against 
production and income risks for non-migrating household members. Taylor (1999) argues 
that remittances set in motion a development dynamic by relaxing production and 
investment constraints that households face. Remittances may be used to boost production 
through financing of inputs, new production technologies and activities. They also act as 
insurance by providing households with income that may be uncorrelated, negatively 
correlated or not highly correlated with farm income.  
                                                 
2 This section as well as the following section on estimation draw heavily from Taylor et al (2003). 
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migrant-sending households. If credit and risk constraints are binding, and migration helps 
households to ease these constraints, then migration and remittances should have a positive 
effect on local production and incomes of migrant-sending households. The more liquidity-
constrained a household is the greater is the marginal income effect of remittances.  
This theory analyzes migration as a household decision rather than an individual 
decision. Continuing interactions between migrants and rural households imply that a 
household model would be more suitable than an individual level model of migration 
decisions.  
Taylor (1999) explains that NELM entails a new view about how interactions 
between migration and development are conceptualized and modeled. Earlier research 
tended to separate the determinants of migration from the impacts of migration on migrant 
sending households. However, in NELM, the origin of migration (represented by 
households’ desire to overcome credit and risk constraints) implies certain outcomes of 
migration for development. For instance, migration is expected to have a positive effect on 
local production, as remittances enable households to overcome production constraints. An 
implication of NELM is that there are potential correlations between migration and other 
income sources, and therefore migration cannot be modeled separately from other aspects 
of the farm household. 
Further, Taylor (1999) points out that “often, the factors encouraging people to 
migrate also limit the productive potential of migrant remittances. Poor public services and 
infrastructure seriously limit the potential for remittances to contribute to local 
production”. It is also argued that migration is likely to have a larger impact on 
  10development where local institutions are in place to channel savings from migrant-sending 
households to local producers. This is where “migrants do not have to play the 
simultaneous roles of workers, savers, investors, and producers” (Taylor, 1999).  
 
Theoretical model 
  Following Rozelle (1999)) and Taylor et. al. (2003), consider a household that may 
invest a fixed input ) (I  like land or labor in either a low-return or a high-return activity. 
Let , for i=0, 1 be the output from these two activities, respectively. The returns from 
these activities are influenced by a vector of household characteristics . Given 
relative prices p
i Q
) ( HH Z
1/p0, the household will specialize in the high-return activity, obtaining an 
output ) , ( 1
*
HH Z I f Q = , and an income . Assume the household faces a market 
constraint in investing in the high-return activity,
) (
* * Q g Y =
1 (.) I c = , with  I I < 1  and where  
represents a constraint such as lack of formal credit that limits the household to invest only 
I
(.) c
1 of the fixed input. Migrants (M) could ease the credit constraint through remittances, 
(R). The effect of migration on production constraints may not always be positive. For 
instance, if households face a missing or imperfect labor market, migration may tighten the 
constraint on investing in high-return activity by forcing the household to rely on the now 
reduced family labor. 
  The new economics of labor migration theory hypothesizes that the constraint to 
investing in a high-return activity is a function of migration and remittances, such 
that . Further, we can hypothesize that  1 ) , ( I M R c = 0 < M c and , since migration 
reduces household labor and provides capital for production. Under this binding constraint, 
0 > R c
  11the household’s constrained output from the high-return activity is , while 
that from the low-return activity is
) , ( 1 1 1 HH
c Z I f Q =
) , ( 1 0 0 HH
c Z I I f Q − = . The household achieves a 
constrained income of , with  ) , ( 0 1
c c c Q Q g Y =
* Y Y
c < , the unconstrained income. 
  Under imperfect markets, we expect migration to have non-zero impacts on 
household income. However, since the relative magnitudes of derivatives  and  are 
unknown, the overall effect of migration on total household income is ambiguous. A 
finding of a significant effect of migration and remittances on any non-migration source of 
income in the migrant-sending household would be evidence in support of the NELM 
theory. In particular, negative effects would imply that migration exacerbates labor 
shortages, while positive effects would mean that migration complements productivity or 
household income by relaxing credit or risk constraints. 
M c R c
 
Econometric Model and Estimation Strategy 
Following the work of Taylor et al (2003), suppose a household faces production 
constraints, and migration (M) and remittances (R) influence these constraints. Then a 
vector of non-remittance household income sources (Y) depends on M and R, as well as 
various individual, household and community characteristics (XY): 
Y Y X R M Y ε β β β β + + + + = 3 2 1 0        ( 1 )  
Through production, migration and remittances may have differential effects on different 
income sources.  The income components considered are total farm, crop, off-farm and 
business income. The objective of this paper is to determine the impact of migration and 
remittances on household income from various sources. Therefore we will estimate 
equation (1) for each income source. The null hypotheses associated with the NELM 
  12theory is that neither migration nor remittances affect household income sources; i.e.  
0 , 2 1 = β β , in each of the income equations. 
Remittances are generated by migrant family members. Given migration, they are a 
function of human capital (individual) and household characteristics (XR): 
R R X M R ε δ δ δ + + + = 2 1 0         ( 2 )  
The vector of variables, XR affect a migrant’s motives and ability to send remittances back 
home. 
Migration is in turn a function of individual, household and community characteristics 
(XM), such that: 
M M X M ε α α + + = 0          ( 3 )  
The econometric model is based on a set of inter-related equations on household 
income sources, remittances and migration.  Equations (1-3) form a recursive system and 
will be estimated using simultaneous-equation econometric methods. Given that the 
number of migrants per household is a non-negative number, and not every household 
sends migrants while some households send out more than one migrant, the migration 
decision is represented as a Poisson process.  
Remittances and migration are determined endogenously along with income 
sources. To control for endogeneity, instruments are used to identify remittances and 
migration. We use three variables to identify migration. The first is the annual total 
precipitation to total potential evapotranspiration ratio. Potential evapotranspiration is a 
representation of the environmental demand for evapotranspiration. Therefore, this ratio is 
an aridity index; a numerical indicator of the degree of dryness (harshness) of the climate 
at a given location. The second is the population density, while the third is the education 
  13attainment of the most educated male and female adults in the household. These variables 
are chosen since in Kenya, most urban-rural migration occurs typically in areas with harsh 
climate, or high population density. Also, other things being equal, more educated people 
are more likely to migrate because they may find better employment opportunities outside 
the village.  
As mentioned before, many factors influence the willingness to send remittances 
back home. Taylor et al (2003) indicate that migrant remittances may be influenced by 
village norms to remit. To identify remittances, we use the average level of remittances 
among households in the village as a proxy for the village norm, the number of people in a 
household with a formal job and divisional dummies. The latter are meant to capture 





Data used is from a three-wave rural household panel collected by the Tegemeo Institute of 
Agricultural Policy and Development, Egerton University, Kenya.  The household surveys 
collected information from rural households in Kenya over a seven-year period, with 
surveys carried out in 1997, 2000, and 2004.  There are 1,500, 1,446 and 1,397 households 
in each of these years, respectively. The data contains information on household farm 
production and off-farm activities as well as individual, household and community 
characteristics.  
A migrant is defined as a household member who has been away from home for at 
least one month, working outside the village but not in school. The independent variables 
used in the analysis are as shown in table A1. 
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Results   
Tables 1 and 2 report the econometric results. The parameter estimates of the migration 
equation are generally consistent with the expected effects of the explanatory variables on 
migration. Larger households send more migrants since they have more labor to allocate 
across various activities. Also, households with a female head and more educated adult 
members (both male and female), and with security of land tenure are more likely to send 
migrants.  Also, wealthier households, as proxied by value of non-productive assets, send 
out more migrants. Although the coefficient on wealth is very small, wealth may be a 
proxy for networks, information and access to outside economic opportunities that enable 
wealthy households to send out more migrants. However, households with more land per 
capita that can earn a decent living from the farm are less likely to send migrants. This is 
because they need more labor for their larger farms, and especially where cropping system 
is intensive in family labor and perfect hired substitutes are not available. Households 
residing in villages where opportunities for work are available, send fewer migrants. The 
variables that identify migration are significant. More migrants are expected from areas 
with harsh climatic conditions and high population density as well as from households with 
more educated adults. 
  The results in tables 1 and 2 show different remittance equations, each of which is 
estimated jointly with a different source of household income. For instance, column (2) of 
Table 1 shows determinants of remittances, when remittances and crop income equations 
are jointly estimated.  The results in the remittance equations are generally comparable in 
terms of signs and magnitude across all the specifications. As expected, remittances are a 
  15positive function of number of migrants, although the effects are not statistically 
significant in any of the specifications. Female-headed households receive more 
remittances than male-headed households. Evidence from our estimates in the income 
models show that they earn lower incomes. Therefore, our finding is consistent with the 
notion that female-headed households are poorer, and are in need of more financial 
support. In general, poorer households as represented by the estimate for non-productive 
assets, receive more remittances.  
Land per capita has a large positive effect on remittances.  Migrants from 
households with more land tend to remit more money. This is consistent with the 
expectation that households that own more land are more likely to be wealthier and provide 
their children with better education. As a result, the children get higher paying jobs and 
have incentives to invest in their land. The variables chosen to identify remittances i.e., 
mean village remittances and number of people with a formal job, are significant and 
positively related to remittances. 
  The number of migrants is negatively and significantly related to crop income and 
farm income while remittances are positively related to these income sources, but are not 
significant.  This is consistent with findings from other studies that crop income decreases 
as migrants leave their households. This finding supports one of the predictions of NELM, 
that migration is associated with lost-labor effects. Migration tightens the labor constraints 
in migrant-sending households. The measure of remittances in our data may not be very 
accurate, particularly because it is hard to obtain precise amounts of remittances from 
recall data. Rather, from our data, it seems like the number of people with formal job is a 
better measure of the level of remittances. These results do not provide a clear and direct 
  16support of the NELM hypothesis that remittances loosen capital constraints on crop 
production or farm production in general. Therefore, unlike in other studies we do not 
observe a situation where remittances offset labor-lost effects as a result of migration. 
Estimates from the crop and farm income models in table 1 indicate that wealthier 
households and those with more labor or land are able to generate more income. Contrary 
to our expectations, security of land tenure is associated with lower incomes.  Instead of 
capturing incentives to invest in land, this variable may be capturing dynamics related to 
commercial farm production. Only 13 percent of households do not have security of tenure 
and it is possible that a large proportion of these households hire land for commercial 
purposes. Consequently, they tend to generate far greater crop and farm incomes compared 
to those who own the land. 
Household demographic and human capital variables have a significant effect on 
crop and farm income. Households with younger families generate lower crop and farm 
incomes. This is may be because a significant amount of their wealth is invested in their 
children, particularly in education. This is in direct competition with investment in farm 
production activities. Education and experience of a household head improve incomes. 
Road infrastructure plays a role in rural income generation. In particular, compared 
to an international road, a provincial or a district road is associated with lower incomes. 
However, a local road is positively associated with crop and farm income. The type of road 
indicates how remote an area is. Hence, the more remote an area is, the more important is 
income from the farm. 
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income sources 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Migration  Remittance (crop)  Crop income  Remittance (farm)  Farm income 
Predicted no. of migrants    445.371  -9,968.10***  445.339  -12,465.75*** 
   (1.25)  (3.11)  (1.25)  (3.72) 
Remittances     0.382    0.414 
     (0.89)    (0.92) 
Household size  0.140***  106.008 14,335.46***  103.277  17,861.62*** 
 (23.09)  (0.43)  (6.56)  (0.42)  (7.81) 
No. of children < 6 years  -0.104***  -36.934  -10,154.1***  -34.707  -13,377.94*** 
 (6.77)  (0.11)  (3.24)  (0.10)  (4.08) 
No. of children 6-14 years  -0.093***  27.639  -4,148.349  29.727  -6,857.84** 
 (8.21)  (0.10)  (1.60)  (0.11)  (2.53) 
Male head (dummy)  -0.078*  -3,206.280*** 7,016.473  -3,219.282*** 9,985.973 
 (1.83)  (3.82)  (0.88)  (3.84)  (1.19) 
Education of head  -0.000 160.307*  1,964.338**  161.606*  2,422.422*** 
 (0.07)  (1.86)  (2.46)  (1.88)  (2.90) 
Experience of head  0.004***  42.772**  243.978  43.154**  352.525* 
 (2.74)  (1.97)  (1.19)  (1.99)  (1.65) 
Land per capita  -0.148***  3,677.615*** 21,234.33***  3,669.873***  25,668.847*** 
 (6.08)  (14.15)  (7.26)  (14.12)  (8.39) 
Non-productive assets  6.2e-08* -0.002***  0.040***  -0.002***  0.056*** 
 (1.95)  (4.30)  (7.65)  (4.29)  (10.08) 
Land tenure (dummy)  0.099**    -20,201.73**    -19,294.712** 
 (1.97)    (2.51)    (2.29) 
No. of villagers earning a wage -0.001***  -0.206  -433.84***  -0.214  -537.641*** 
 (2.64)  (0.02)  (6.29)  (0.03)  (7.45) 
Adult death  0.064  -1,127.509 12,202.14  -1,124.722  14,536.487 
 (1.34)  (0.98)  (1.13)  (0.98)  (1.28) 
Distance to fertilizer store  -0.004**    22.658    92.494 
 (2.43)    (0.10)    (0.39) 
Provincial road (dummy)
a 0.170** -588.715  -21,057.73*  -478.498  -20,851.27 
 (2.52)  (0.17)  (1.70)  (0.14)  (1.61) 
District road (dummy)  0.037 507.684  -8,481.18  605.685  -12,477.11 
 (0.76)  (0.32)  (0.94)  (0.39)  (1.32) 
Local road (dummy)  0.027  -335.494 28,178.35***  -251.603  22,442.374*** 
 (0.60)  (0.20)  (3.58)  (0.15)  (2.73) 
Population density  0.0002***         
 (3.57)         
Precipitation/evapotranspiration 
ratio 
-0.853***        
 (8.72)         
Male highest education in 
household 
0.041***        
 (7.46)         
Female highest education in 
household 
0.037***        
 (7.23)         
Village mean remittances    0.927***    0.925***   
   (18.10)    (18.07)   
No. of people with a formal job    2,644.803***    2,639.721***   
   (7.14)    (7.13)   
Productive assets      0.105***    0.116*** 
     (10.70)    (11.30) 
Maize stocks, lagged     4,879.313***    6,295.499*** 




  18Table 1 (continued) 
Applied for credit (dummy)      28,329.821***    30,314.62*** 
     (5.28)    (5.40) 
Distance to extension      -710.691    -421.73 
     (1.43)    (0.81) 
         
Altitude     5.644***    10.82*** 
     (3.05)    (5.60) 
Rainfall     31.669***    29.94*** 
     (3.44)    (3.11) 
Constant   -6,246.069**  -63,241.240*** -6,256.917**  -87,693.01*** 
    (2.27)  (2.76) (2.27) (3.65) 
Division dummies     yes    yes   
Observations  4333  4324  4324 4324 4324 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: 




Productive assets, the stock of maize before harvest and a variable indicating that a 
household applied for credit are positively and significantly related to crop and farm 
income. These variables are measures of wealth, implying that wealthier households have 
more resources to invest in farm production. As expected, areas of higher altitude are 
associated with more rainfall which have better climatical conditions for diverse farm 
production. 
Evidence from table 2 indicates that number of migrants is positively and 
significantly related to off-farm and business incomes. Remittances have a positive and 
significant effect on off-farm income but a negative and insignificant effect on business 
income. Unlike businesses, off-farm activities are often done on a small scale and do not 
provide regular income to the households. Therefore, households that engage in these 
activities still need additional support. Households with very young children (under 6 
years) have less off-farm income. This is because the major component of off-farm 
activities is casual farm labor and care-giving for young children tightens time constraints 
in a household. 
  19Households with male heads who are more educated have higher off-farm income. 
This possibly relates a small number of household heads with a formal job, particularly 
teachers and civil servants. Experience of a household head implies that older heads in 
rural areas are less likely to generate incomes from off-farm activities and businesses. 
Instead, they earn their income from farm production activities. 
Land per capita is positively to business income while adult death and road dummy 
variables are negatively related to off-farm and business income. More productive assets 
promote generation of off-farm and business income while land tenure is positively related 
to off-farm income. As expected, higher altitude and more rainfall are negatively related to 
both off-farm and business income. 
 
  20Table 2. Determinants of remittances and their effects on household income sources 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Remittance  (off-
farm) 
Off-farm income  Remittance 
(business) 
Business income 
Predicted no. of migrants  395.178 10,710.953***  386.749 3,863.447** 
  (1.13) (5.35)  (1.10) (2.55) 
Remittances   2.550***   -0.298 
   (9.35)   (1.44) 
Household size  -25.606  496.742  135.943  1,550.798 
  (0.11) (0.36)  (0.56) (1.49) 
No. of children <6 years  121.259  -3,500.062*  -23.744  -1,152.978 
  (0.36) (1.77)  (0.07) (0.77) 
No. of children 6-14 years  188.432  -601.635  11.285  150.404 
  (0.68) (0.37)  (0.04) (0.12) 
Male head (dummy)  -3,205.720*** 13,270.941***  -3,186.172*** 5,817.996 
  (3.83) (2.62)  (3.80) (1.52) 
Education of head  119.175 3,463.190***  162.520*  -471.179 
  (1.39) (6.83)  (1.89) (1.23) 
Experience of head  41.580*  -626.579***  43.481**  -308.463*** 
  (1.93) (4.83)  (2.01) (3.15) 
Land per capita  3,687.354***  -2,638.584 3,648.499***  5,501.132*** 
  (14.25) (1.42)  (14.05) (3.92) 
Non-productive assets  -0.002*** 0.067***  -0.002*** 0.062*** 
  (4.20) (19.87)  (4.31) (24.43) 
No. of villagers earning a 
wage 
5.890 -158.254***  0.653 -130.115*** 
  (0.72) (3.65)  (0.08) (3.97) 
Adult death  -899.826  -15,599.753** -1,145.974  -9,021.388* 
  (0.78) (2.27)  (1.00) (1.74) 
Provincial road (dummy)  -1,920.996 -17,496.650**  227.625  -13,282.442** 
  (0.56) (2.23)  (0.06) (2.24) 
District road (dummy)  722.210 -13,419.168**  452.665 -15,094.411*** 
  (0.47) (2.36)  (0.29) (3.51) 
Local road (dummy)  -544.468  -7,839.867  106.048  -3,727.366 
  (0.34) (1.58)  (0.06) (0.99) 
Village mean remittances  0.845***    0.932***   
  (16.75)   (18.21)  
No. of people with a formal 
job 
4,329.210***   2,726.144***  
 (12.15)    (7.36)   
Productive  assets   0.044***   0.015*** 
   (7.37)   (3.28) 
Land  tenure  (dummy)   8,676.861*   -2,724.038 
   (1.77)   (0.71) 
Applied for credit (dummy)    -3,465.159    -2,059.883 
   (1.06)   (0.80) 
Distance to fertilizer store    208.536    149.653 
   (1.49)   (1.37) 
Altitude   -5.330***   -3.976*** 
   (4.77)   (4.71) 
Rainfall   -23.721***   -21.046*** 
   (4.11)   (4.79) 
Constant -6,744.917**  73,525.417*** -6,540.594**  69,626.207*** 
  (2.50) (5.37)  (2.38) (6.71) 
Division  dummies  yes  yes  
Observations  4333 4333  4333 4333 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
  21Conclusion 
Findings from this study support the NELM hypothesis that migration is associated with 
lost-labor effects. However, unlike in other studies, we do not observe a situation where 
remittances offset labor-loss effects as a result of migration. In general, our results indicate 
that taken together, migration and remittances play a role in households’ income 
generation activities.  
  It is also evident that better road infrastructure will promote generation of rural 
incomes, particularly from agriculture. Also, many farming households appear to be capital 
constrained, and migration and associated remittances are valuable in supporting migrant-
sending households who rely mainly on farming income for their livelihood.  
We acknowledge that this study may not capture all of the benefits of migration. As 
Taylor (1999) puts it, the impacts of remittances on migrant-sending households may be 
transferred to other households in the local area (community spill-over effects) or even to 
farther areas in the country through trade. Micro-economy wide modeling techniques may 
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  23Appendix 
 
Table A1. Summary statistics for variables  
   Mean Std.  Deviation 
Number of migrants  1.12  1.59 
Remittances per household  5273.88  19699.75 
Crop income  89300.21  185778.48 
Farm income  110470.64  200139.90 
Business and informal income   26128.18  90783.96 
Household size  7.75  3.20 
Number of children less than 6 years   .84  1.06 
Number of children 6-14 years   1.94  1.58 
Education for head  6.26  4.42 
Experience of head  39.21  17.28 
Per capita land size  .71  1.23 
Non productive asset  27173.88  539657.09 
Value of productive assets  102421.70  295545.08 
Number of villagers earning a wage  88.22  43.42 
Working-age adult death (dummy )  .06  .25 
Distance to where fertilizer is bought (km)  8.98  11.84 
Provincial road dummy  .07  .26 
District road dummy  .27  .44 
Local road dummy  .51  .50 
International road dummy  .13  .33 
Population density  324.53  247.96 
Annual total precipitation to total potential evapotranspiration ratio  .82  .17 
Amount of long and short rainfall in a growing season   887.04  310.18 
Altitude  5347.59 1597.55 
Number of people in household with formal job  .68  .80 
Household tried to obtain any credit (cash/in-kind)   .46  .50 
Number of 90 kg bags of maize in stock from previous harvest  1.16  3.02 
Male highest education attainment in household  9.24  3.60 
Female highest education attainment in household  8.51  3.50 
Village mean remittances  5273.88  6902.59 
Distance to extension service (km)  5.37  5.58 
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